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7		DISTRICT COURT F OF WASHINGTON
8	Darold R.J. Stenson,	NO. CV-08-5079-LRS
9	,	RESPONSE TO MOTION
10	Plaintiff,	FOR TEMPORARY
11	V.	RESTRAINING ORDER OR PRELIMINARY
	Eldon Vail, Secretary of	INJUNCTION
12	Washington Department of Corrections (in his official	
13	capacity), et al.,	
14	Defendants.	
15	The Defendants, by and through	n their attorneys, Robert M. McKenna,
16	Attorney General, and John J. Samson,	Assistant Attorney General, responds to
17	Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restrain	ning order or preliminary injunction.
18	I. STATEMEN	NT OF THE CASE
19	Stenson was sentenced to death in	1994. The state supreme court affirmed
20	the sentence in 1997, and denied a first	et collateral challenge in 2001. State v.
21	Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 940 P.2d 12	39 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008
22	(1998); In re Stenson, 142 Wn.2d 71	0, 16 P.3d 1 (2001). The state court

1	subsequently denied three collateral challenges as barred under state law. In re
2	Stenson, 150 Wn.2d 207, 76 P.3d 241 (2003); In re Stenson, 153 Wn.2d 137,
3	102 P.3d 151 (2004); Exhibit 1, Order, <i>In re Stenson</i> , Cause No. 82332-4.
4	Stenson sought habeas corpus relief in federal court in 2001. The Ninth
5	Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on
6	October 6, 2008. Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.
7	denied, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008). The Ninth Circuit issued the mandate, the stay
8	of execution terminated, and the date of execution reset to December 3, 2008.
9	In September 2008, Stenson filed a state court action, challenging the date of
10	execution. The state court denied the petition, and denied a stay of execution.
11	Exhibit 2, Order, <i>Stenson v. Vail</i> , Cause No. 82197-6.
12	In October 2008, Stenson filed an amended complaint in the state trial
13	court. Exhibit 3, First Amended Complaint, Stenson v. Vail, et al., Thurston
14	County Cause No. 08-2-02080-8. Stenson alleged that both lethal injection and
15	hanging are cruel and unusual punishment, and that he has been denied a right to
16	make an informed election of a method of execution, and that there is not a proper
17	delegation of legislative authority to develop a policy for methods of execution.
18	Stenson named the same defendants and raised the same claims presented in this
19	federal complaint. See Exhibit 3. Defendants moved to dismiss the state
20	complaint. Stenson moved for a stay of execution. The state court granted in part
21	and denied in part the motion to dismiss. Exhibit 4, Order, Stenson v. Vail,
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Thurston County Cause No. 08-2-02080-8. The court dismissed the hanging claim, but denied the motion to dismiss Stenson's remaining claims challenging lethal injection. Exhibit 4. The action remains pending before the state trial court. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. Exhibit 5, Order, *Stenson v. Vail, et al.*, Thurston County Cause No. 08-2-02080-8. The judge found that Stenson did not show a likelihood of success on the merits.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court should deny a stay of execution.

II. ARGUMENT

A. EQUITY BARS A STAY, AND STENSON CANNOT SHOW A LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS.

1. Equity Bars A Stay Of Execution.

"State retains a significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely fashion." *Nelson v. Campbell*, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004); *see also In re Blodgett*, 502 U.S. 236 (1992). "Both the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence." *Hill v. McDonough*, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) (citing *Calderon v. Thompson*, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998). In considering whether to grant a stay of execution, "[e]quity must take into consideration the State's strong interest in proceeding with its judgment and . . . attempt[s] at manipulation." *Nelson*, 541 U.S. at 649 (quoting *Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of California*, 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992)).

A stay of execution is not available as a matter of right, and the filing of an action "does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as a

matter of course." Hill, 547 U.S. at 583-84. The Court should "consider the
last-minute nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to
grant equitable relief." Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654. The Court "must consider not
only the likelihood of success on the merits and the relative harm to the parties,
but also the extent to which the inmate has delayed unnecessarily in bringing
the claim." Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649-50. "Given the State's significant interest
in enforcing its criminal judgment, there is a strong equitable presumption
against the grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time
as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay." Id. at
650; see also Hill, 547 U.S. at 584; Hill v. McDonough, 464 F.3d 1256 (11th
Cir. 2006); Hill v. McDonough, 548 U.S. 940 (2006).
Equity bars a stay of execution. Stenson's sentence became final in 1998
when the Supreme Court denied certiorari on direct review. Stenson v.
Washington, 523 U.S. 1008 (1998). Stenson has also known since 1996 that he
would be executed by lethal injection. RCW 10.95.180. The Supreme Court
held as early as 2004 that challenges to lethal injection could be brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004). Stenson delayed
bringing this action until the eve of his execution, just six judicial days before
the scheduled date. Equity bars a stay of execution.
While an inmate may challenge lethal injection in a civil rights action,
the filing of such an action does not entitle the inmate to a stay of execution as a

matter of right. Hill, 547 U.S. at 584. The Court directed the lower courts to
consider whether Hill was entitled to a stay of execution. Id. The Court
stressed there is "a strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay
where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration
of the merits without requiring entry of a stay." Hill, 547 U.S. at 584. On
remand, the Eleventh Circuit ruled "the equities do not support Hill's request"
for a stay of execution. Hill, 464 F.3d at 1259. Among other things, Hill did
not file his claim until the eve of his execution in 2006, even though the state
court had rejected a similar challenge to lethal injection as early as 2000. Id.
Since Washington has had challenges to lethal injection even earlier, see, e.g.,
In re Pirtle, 136 Wn.2d 467, 496, 965 P.2d 593 (1998), Stenson could have
brought this action earlier. Stenson simply chose to wait. Equity bars a stay. See,
e.g., Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292-94 (11th Cir. 2008); Lambert v.
Buss, 498 F.3d 446, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2007); Woods v. Buss, 496 F.3d 620, 623
(7th Cir. 2007); Nooner v. Norris, 491 F.3d 804, 807-10 (8th Cir. 2007);
Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 1318, 1322-26 (11th Cir. 2007); Workman v.
Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 911-13 (6th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635,
638-41 (11th Cir. 2007); Cooey v. Strickland, 484 F.3d 424, 425 (6th Cir.
2007); Hamilton v. Jones, 472 F.3d 814, 816 (10th Cir. 2007); Diaz v.
McDonough, 472 F.3d 849, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2006); Rutherford v.
McDonough, 466 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Livingston, 457 F.3d

390, 391 (5th Cir. 2006); *Smith v. Johnson*, 440 F.3d 262, 263 (5th Cir. 2006); *Neville v. Johnson*, 440 F.3d 221, 222 (5th Cir. Cir. 2006). "[A] deathsentenced inmate may not wait until execution is imminent before filing an action to enjoin a State's method of carrying it out." *Berry v. Epps*, 506 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2007); *see also Workman*, 486 F.3d at 913; *Gomez*, 503 U.S. at 654; *White v. Johnson*, 429 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 2005); *Cooey v. Strickland*, 479 F.3d 412, 419-20 (6th Cir. 2007); *McNair v. Allen*, 515 F.3d 1168, 1177 (11th Cir. 2008); *Henyard v. Secretary, DOC*, 543 F.3d 644 (11th Cir. 2008). In light of the strong presumption against granting a stay of execution, equity demands that the denial of any stay of execution.

2. Stenson Fails To Show A Substantial Likelihood Of Success.

a. The Action Is Barred Under Younger.

The Younger doctrine requires federal court abstention where there is ongoing state court litigation. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). The Younger doctrine is "fully applicable to civil proceedings in which important state interests are involved." Moore, 442 U.S. at 423 (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986). The ongoing state court action, initiated by Stenson himself, satisfies the three prong test for abstention. "The first prong requires that the state proceedings be ongoing." Mission Oaks

Mobile Home Park v. City of Hollister, 989 F.2d 359, 360-61 (9th Cir. 1993). Stenson filed the state court action, raising the same claims and naming the same defendants as in the action before this Court, and the action remains pending before the state trial court. "The second prong requires that the proceedings implicate important state interests." *Id.* at 361. This prong is satisfied because the action involves the State's compelling interest in carrying out a lawful sentence. "The third and final prong requires that the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions." *Id.* "The Supreme Court has indicated it will assume that state court proceedings are adequate 'in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary." *Id.* Since Stenson's state court action is still pending, this Court must abstain. Stenson cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits.

b. Stenson Has Not Exhausted Administrative Remedies.

No action may be brought by a prisoner challenging the conditions of his sentence until administrative remedies are exhausted. Exhaustion is mandatory. *Jones v. Bock*, 127 S. Ct. 910, 918-19 (2007); *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731, 740, 742 (2001); *Porter v. Nussle*, 543 U.S. 516, 524-32 (2002); *Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006). Stenson failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies. Although Stenson filed a grievance, which upon reconsideration was denied, *see* Exhibit 6, Grievance and Responses, he did not then further appeal his remaining administrative remedies.

c. Stenson's Claims Fail On The Merits.

Lethal injection is presumed constitutional. *Campbell v. Wood*, 18 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 1994) (*en banc*). Stenson must rebut the presumption by presenting evidence that the method of execution is actually cruel punishment. *Id.*; *In re Kemmler*, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). Speculation that an execution might cause an unnecessary risk of pain does not show a constitutional violation. The possibility of an accident "cannot and need not be eliminated from the execution process in order to survive constitutional review." *LeGrand v. Stewart*, 133 F.3d 1253, 1265 (9th Cir. 1998).

The Supreme Court rejected the very claim now presented by Stenson, holding that lethal injection is a constitutional method of execution, *Baze v. Rees*, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1529 (2008). The Court held that a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to Kentucky's would not violate the Eighth Amendment. *Id.* at 1537. Washington's protocol is substantially similar to Kentucky's protocol. DOC Policy 490.200 expressly requires minimum qualifications of members of the lethal injection team, sufficient practice sessions, the establishment of two intravenous lines with a normal flow of saline through each line, the administration of 3 grams of sodium thiopental, the Superintendent to observe the inmate for signs of consciousness after the administration of sodium thiopental and before the administration of pancuronium bromide, and the administration of an additional dose of 3 grams of sodium thiopental before the pancuronium bromide if the

1	Superintendent observes the inmate is conscious after the administration of
2	the first dose of sodium thiopental. See Exhibit 8, Declaration of Dell-
3	Autumn Witten, Attachment A. The individual who will site the intravenous
4	lines during the execution regularly inserts intravenous lines as a part of
5	his/her professional duties, and it is reasonable to assign this task to this
6	individual. Exhibit 7, Declaration of Stephen Sinclair; Exhibit 11,
7	Declaration of Fiona Jane Couper, Ph.D.; Exhibit 10, Declaration of Mark
8	Dershwitz, M.D., Ph.D. Additionally, the three practice sessions with the
9	siting of IV lines have occurred. Exhibit 7, Declaration of Sinclair; Exhibit
10	9, Declaration of Dan J. Pacholke. The amended policy is substantially
11	similar to Kentucky's protocol. The proper application of the protocol will
12	result in a rapid, painless and humane death. Exhibits 10 and 11. The policy
13	is constitutional. See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2008);
14	Workman, 486 F.3d at 905-10; Lambert v. Buss, 498 F.3d 446, 448-54 (7th Cir.
15	2007); Woods v. Buss, 496 F.3d at 622-23; Hamilton v. Jones, 472 F.3d 814,
16	816-17 (10th Cir. 2007); Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004);
17	Poland v. Stewart, 151 F.3d. 11014 (9th Cir. 1998); Woolls v. McCotter, 798
18	F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1986); Cooey v. Strickland, 544 F.3d 588 (6th Cir. October
19	9, 2008).
20	Finally, Stenson alleges the State lacks authority to promulgate an
21	execution policy. The issue of state law is without merit. First, the "legislative

1	delegation" rule advanced by Stenson does not apply. The policy is a directive
2	governing internal operations at a prison, and is not an administrative rule that
3	creates law. Joyce v. Dept. of Corrections, 155 Wn.2d 306, 323, 199 P.3d 825
4	(2005). The APA does not apply to policies governing offenders and prisons.
5	RCW 34.05.030(1)(c); Dawson v. Hearing Committee, 92 Wn.2d 391, 597 P.2d
6	1353 (1979); Foss v. DOC, 82 Wn. App. 355, 358-59, 918 P.2d 521 (1996).
7	Second, even if the rule applied, the policy is a lawful delegation since the
8	Legislature described in general terms what is to be done and by which agency.
9	State v. Simmons, 152 Wn.2d 450, 455, 98 P.3d 789 (2004); RCW 10.95.160-
10	.190; RCW 72.01.090; RCW 72.02.040; RCW 72.09.050; RCW 72.02.045.
11	And there are adequate procedural safeguards to control against arbitrary
12	agency action. Simmons, 152 Wn.2d at 457; State v. Crown Zellerbach, 92
13	Wn.2d 894, 901, 602 P.2d 1172 (1979). Such protections exist under existing
14	Washington law. See, e.g., RAP 16.2; RCW 7.16.150; RCW 7.16.290.
15	III. CONCLUSION
16	For the reasons stated above, the Defendants respectfully requests that
17	the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for a stay of execution.
18	DATED this 21st day of November, 2008.
19	Respectfully submitted,
20	ROBERT M. MCKENNA
21	Attorney General
22	<u>/s/ John J. Samson</u> JOHN J. SAMSON, WSBA #22187

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on November 21, 2008, I caused to be
3	electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the
4	following:
5	SHERILYN PETERSON SPeterson@perkinscoie.com RICHARD COYLE RCoyle@perkinscoie.com
6	RICHARD COTLE RCoyle@perkinscole.com
7	/a/ Vathy Iamana
8	/s/ Kathy Jerenz KATHY JERENZ Lagel Assistant
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